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et al.: When Must a Transaction Between a Corporation and Its Directors B

WHEN MUST A TRANSACTION BETWEEN A CORPORATION
AND ITS DIRECTORS BE FAIR AND REASONABLE?
AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT OF
INTEREST STATUTES
Minnesota's Business Corporation Act provides three alternatives by which a
transaction between a corporationand one of its directorscan be upheld. An interested director transaction will not be void ifit is approved by the shareholders,
approved by the directors, or ifit is fair and reasonable. This Note examines
Minnesota'sprovision in light of its plain language, safeguards, and legislative
history, and concludes that the three alternativesshould be readdisjunctively. The
Note then examines the question of what constitutes a "fair and reasonable"
transaction.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the common law
aged directors from entering into contracts with their respective
tions.I Courts during this period held these interested
transactions2 strictly voidable3 on the grounds that the director,

discourcorporadirector
a fiduci-

1. See Marsh, Are Dtrectors Trustees? Coniet of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW. 35, 36-39 (1966).
2. An interested director transaction occurs when a director enters into a transaction
with his corporation. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special
Pamphlet 1985). A transaction also involves an interested director where the director's
corporation enters into a transaction with any other organization in which the director
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ary of the corporation,4 could not be expected to deal fairly with the
corporation if his own interests were at stake. 5 Although this rule of
strict voidability discouraged directors from dealing unfairly with their
corporations, it also discouraged them from entering into contracts with
their corporations that could benefit the corporation.6
As this common law rule of strict voidability evolved into a more lib7
eral rule allowing corporate ratification of interested director contracts,
participates as a director, officer, or other representative or has a material financial interest. Id The financial interests of the director's immediate relatives are attributed to that
director. MINN. STAT. § 302A.255, subd. 2(b) (1982). See hrna note 20 and accompanying
text.
3. See Marsh, supra note 1, at 36-37; see also Wardell v. Union Pac. Ry., 103 U.S. 651,
658 (1880); Davis v. Rock Creek L. F. & M. Co., 55 Cal. 359, 364 (1880); Mallory v.
Mallory-Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 131, 23 A. 708, 710-11 (1891); Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v.
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 16 Md. 456, 507 (1860). But see Union Pac. Ry. v. Credit
Mobilier of Am., 135 Mass. 367, 377-78 (1883) (interested director transaction not voidable unless fraudulent).
In 1880, any transaction involving an interested director was voidable by either the
corporation or its shareholders. Marsh, supra note 1, at 36. This rule of strict voidability
applied regardless of whether the transaction was fair or approved by a majority of disinterested directors. Id at 36-37. But seeJanney v. Minneapolis Indus. Exposition, 79 Minn.
488, 496, 82 N.W. 984, 986 (1900) (although directors are generally prohibited from
purchasing property of their corporation where an assignee holds the corporation's property in trust for the benefit of its creditors, and the court orders the property sold for the
purpose of the trust, a director-creditor may in good faith purchase the property at the
sale).
By 1910, courts began validating transactions between corporations and directors if a
majority of disinterested directors approved it, and the transaction was neither unfair nor
fraudulent. Marsh, supra note 1, at 39-40. The fairness element reflected the court's concern that an interested, nonvoting director could influence the "disinterested" majority of
directors. See 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 439, at 543 (1959).
By 1960, courts refused to summarily invalidate transactions between a corporation
and its director where disinterested director approval was absent. Marsh, supra note 1, at
43. Instead, courts would carefully scrutinize transactions and invalidate those which
were unfair to the corporation. Id.
4. 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838
(rev. perm. ed. 1975); see also United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 138 (1972) (applying
Ohio law); Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 195, 136 N.W. 861, 867 (1912); Munson v.
Syracuse, G. & C. Ry., 103 N.Y. 59, 73, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886); H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 66 (rev. ed. 1946); Bulbulia & Pinto, Stalutory Response to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fduciary Standards, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW.
201, 203 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bulbulia].
5. Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 203.
6. Id. Although an interested director transaction beneficial to the corporation
could theoretically survive this rule of strict voidability, the practical effect of this rule was
to discourage most, if not all, directors from dealing with their corporations. See id at 20304. A reasonable director aware of this rule would be hesitant to enter into a contract
with his corporation knowing that the corporation had an absolute right to void it in the
future.
7. See Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 203. By 1910, courts no longer held interested director transactions strictly voidable, but instead upheld them if they were fair to the corporation and approved by a majority of disinterested directors. Marsh, supra note 1, at 39-40.
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states began enacting conflict of interest statutes which reflected this
common law trend. 8 California enacted the first conflict of interest statute in 1931.9 Since then, thirty-six states have enacted similar statutes.10
The Minnesota statute, I which became effective on January 1, 1984, is
12
the most recently enacted of these statutes.
Like the other thirty-five state conflict of interest statutes, the Minnesota statute provides three alternatives by which a proponent of a transaction between a corporation and one of its directors can uphold the
transaction.1 3 Under the Minnesota statute, a transaction between a corBy 1960, courts upheld interested director transactions if they were fair to the corporation.
Id at 43.
8. See Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 204-05.
9. Id. at 204. The conflict of interest statutes from West Virginia and Rhode Island
predated the California statute but did not serve as a model for the other state statutes.
Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 201 n.4.
10. See in/fa note 67 for a list of these statutes.
11. MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 (1982). Section 302A.255 states:
A contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors, or between a corporation and an organization in or of which one or
more of its directors are directors, officers, or legal representatives or have a material financial interest, is not void or voidable because the director or directors
or the other organizations are parties or because the director or directors are
present at the meeting of the shareholders or the board or a committee at which
the contract or transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified, if:
(a) The contract or transaction was, and the person asserting the validity of the
contract or transaction sustains the burden of establishing that the contract or
transaction was, fair and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was
authorized, approved, or ratified;
(b) The material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the director's
or directors' interest are fully disclosed or known to the shareholders and the
contract or transaction is approved in good faith by the holders of a majority of
the outstanding shares, but shares owned by the interested director or directors
shall not be counted in determining the presence of a quorum and shall not be
voted;
(c) The material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the director's
or directors' interest are fully disclosed or known to the board or a committee,
and the board or committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or
transaction in good faith by a majority of the board or committee, but the interested director or directors shall not be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum and shall not vote; or
(d) The contract or transaction is a distribution described in section 302A.55 1,
subdivision 1, or a merger or exchange described in section 302A.601, subdivision I or 2.
Id., subd. 1; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
12. Section 302.021 of the Minnesota Statutes sets out the effective date of the Minnesota conflict of interest statute as well as the rest of chapter 302A. Between July 1, 1981
and January 1, 1984, all corporations previously incorporated in Minnesota had the option of being governed by chapter 302A. MINN. STAT. § 302A.021, subd. 1, 2 (1982). On
January 1, 1984, all Minnesota corporations became governed by chapter 302A except
corporations which were incorporated in Minnesota before 1940 under chapter 300 and
which were not subsequently governed by chapter 301. Id., subd. 1.
13. See supra note 11 (text of Minnesota conflict of interest statute); see also MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985) (stating that the
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poration and its director is not void if it is fair and reasonable,14 the
shareholders approve it,15 or the directors approve it.16 Although the
conflict of interest statutes in Minnesota and other states separate the
alternatives with the disjunctive "or," thus suggesting that any one of the
three alternatives is sufficient for validation of an interested director
transaction, a majority of courts and commentators have construed these
statutes conjunctively.17 These courts have required a proponent who
has complied with an approval alternative to show in addition that the
transaction is fair and reasonable.18
This Note analyzes the requirements of the different alternatives under
the Minnesota conflict of interest statute. It then focuses on the typical
construction of other state conflict of interest statutes which preceded the
Minnesota statute. After analyzing the Minnesota statute's plain language, safeguards, and legislative history, this Note concludes that the
typical construction used for the predecessors of the Minnesota statute,
which calls for a conjunctive approach, is inappropriate for the Minnesota statute and should be discarded in favor of a disjunctive approach.
Although this Note recommends the disjunctive approach, it emphasizes that under many circumstances the director and shareholder approval alternatives will be unavailable, thus requiring the fairness test.
Since the fairness test may often be necessary, this Note focuses on how
courts both in and outside Minnesota have applied the words "fair and
reasonable" in the corporate law context. This analysis will underscore
the facts which courts have found significant and the factors which
courts have used when applying the fairness test.
II.

MINNESOTA'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATUTE

An interested director transaction is defined by the Minnesota statute
as one between "a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between the corporation and an organization in. . . which one or more of
its directors are directors, officers, or legal representatives or have a
material financial interest."19 A director who has close relatives with a
material financial interest in an organization is considered to have a material financial interest in that organization.20
statute provides three methods of validating an interested director transaction). The
fourth alternative, concerning distributions, mergers, and exchanges, was added to the
statute during the 1982 session and is outside the scope of this Note. Act of March 19,
1982, ch. 497, § 31, subd. 1, 1982 Minn. Laws 547-48 (currently codified at MINN. STAT.

§ 302A.255, subd. I (Supp. 1983)).
14. MINN. STAT. § 302A.255, subd. 1(a) (1982).
15. Id § 302A.255, subd. l(b).
16. Id § 302A.255, subd. 1(c).
17. See bfra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.

18. See id.
19. § 302A.255, subd. 1.
20. § 302A.255, subd. 2(b). According to subdivision 2(b), "A director has a material
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The statute provides that an interested director transaction is not voidable if the directors approve it, the shareholders approve it, or it is fair
and reasonable. 2 ' Compliance with the specific requirements of an alternative is required for upholding a transaction.
A.

The Director Approval Alternative

The director approval alternative requires the material facts of the
transaction to be fully disclosed or known to the board.2 2 A majority of
the board must then authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction in good
faith. The interested director is not counted in determining the presence
of a quorum and may not vote.2 3 In approving the transaction, the
members of the board must act according to the standard of conduct set
forth in Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251.24 In addition to good
faith, this section requires a director to act in a manner which he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances.25 If the approving directors do not meet these
standards, the challenging party may attack the transaction as void or
26
voidable.
A proponent of an interested director transaction must comply with all
of the foregoing requirements before a court will validate the transaction
under the director approval alternative. Hence, if the interested director
fails to fully disclose, or if the approving directors act in bad faith or
otherwise fail to meet the standard set forth in section 302A.251, the
transaction will not be validated despite approval by a majority of the
board.
B.

The Shareholder Approval Alternative

A proponent of an interested director transaction may ratify the transaction through shareholder approval. The shareholder alternative, like
the director alternative, requires good faith approval. The approval
must come from the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares. 2 7
The shareholder approval alternative also precludes interested directors
financial interest in each organization [and presumably in each transaction] in which the
director, or the spouse, parents, children and spouses of children, brothers and sisters and
spouses of brothers and sisters of the director, or any combination of them have a material
financial interest." Id
21.
22.

See id.; supra note 11 (text of Minnesota conflict of interest statute).
If the material facts of the transaction are not fully disclosed, an opponent of the

transaction may attack it as void or voidable. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's
Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
23. § 302A.255, subd. 1(c).
24. § 302A.251, subd. 1.
25. Id
26. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
27. § 302A.255, subd. I(b).
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from establishing a quorum and voting on the transaction. Thus, an interested director who owns a majority of the outstanding shares cannot
use the shareholder approval alternative, since a majority of the outstanding shares necessary for approval would be prohibited from
28
voting.
The shareholder approval alternative, like the director approval alternative, requires full disclosure of material facts. 29 Failure to disclose any
material fact will prevent an interested director from using the shareholder approval alternative to validate a transaction. 30 There must be
full disclosure "not only of the adverse interest of the directors, but [also
of] all material facts bearing on the fairness of the particular transaction
or necessary to an intelligent disposition of it .
,,*"31Thus, like the
director alternative, the shareholder alternative has several requirements
which, if not met, will prevent validation of the interested director's
transaction.
C

The Fairness Test Alternative

As an alternative to obtaining director or shareholder approval, a proponent of an interested director transaction can uphold the transaction
by establishing that it was fair to the corporation.32 Since the issue of
fairness generally depends on the facts of each case, a determination may
33
require a court's decision, as compared to a simple counting of votes.
Thus, the director and shareholder approval alternatives may be more
convenient methods of upholding an interested director transaction than
the fairness test. 34 Although a proponent of an interested director transaction who uses an approval alternative may still be challenged in court,
establishing compliance with an approval alternative should be considerably less difficult than establishing the fairness of the transaction.
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
29. § 302A.255, subd. 1(b). Absent full disclosure, subdivision 1(b) would still be
available if all shareholders knew the material facts. Id As a practical matter, however,
proving knowledge on the part of the shareholders would be much more difficult than
proving full disclosure. Therefore, an interested director attempting to comply with subdivision 1(b) should fully disclose.
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
31. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 982 at 502; see also United Hotels Co. of Am. v.
Mealey, 147 F.2d 816, 819 (2d Cir. 1945); First Trust & Say. Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin
Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416, 427 (8th Cir. 1938); § 302A.255, subd. 1(b); H. BALLANTINE,
supra note 4, § 71, at 178.
32. § 302A.255, subd. I(a); see supra note 11 (text of the Minnesota statute).
33. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
34. Id
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III.

THE DISJUNCTIVE APPROACH ANALYSIS

A.

Background

Although the Minnesota statute separates its alternatives with the disjunctive "or," courts could conceivably construe the statute conjunctively. Some precedent exists for such a construction because earlier
statutes, using the disjunctive "or," have been construed conjunctively by
35
both courts and commentators.
One of the earliest and most renowned cases in which a court adopted
a conjunctive approach for a disjunctively worded statute 36 is Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co. 37 In Remillard, a manufacturing company entered into a contract with a sales corporation. Two of the defendants in the case, Stanley and Sturgis, were interested directors; they
were both directors of the manufacturing company and sole owners of
the sales corporation.
The interested directors argued that, since they had disclosed their in35. See infra note 43 (courts using the conjunctive approach).
36. The conflict of interest statute applicable in Remillard read as follows:
Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good faith, and with a view to
the interests of the corporation. No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a corporation and any
corporation, firm, or association in which one or more of its directors are directors or are financially interested, is either void or voidable because such director
or directors are present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee
thereof which authorizes or approves the contract or transaction, or because his
or their votes are counted for such purpose, if the circumstances specified in any
of the following subdivisions exist:
(a) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the board of directors or committee and noted in the minutes, and the
board or committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction
in good faith by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the vote or
votes of such director or directors.
(b) The fact of the common directorship or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the shareholders, and they approve or ratify the contract or transaction
in good faith by a majority vote or written consent of shareholders entitled to
vote.
(c) The contract or transaction is just and reasonable as to the corporation
at the time it is authorized or approved.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof
which authorizes, approves, or ratifies a contract or transaction.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1955) (current version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West
1977)). The current codification is more similar to § 302A.255 of the Minnesota Statutes.
Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977) and CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1955)

with MINN. STAT. § 302A.255 (1982).
37. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). Although Remillard focuses on the
California statute, its ramifications may be far-reaching since many states, including Minnesota, have enacted statutes with provisions similar to the California statute. Bulbulia,
supra note 4, at 204-05. Unless other state conflict of interest statutes have language or
legislative history which clearly deviates from the California statute, Remillardshould provide insight into the effect of these other statutes. Id. at 205; see also 2A STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 329-37 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
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terest and then approved the transaction as majority shareholders, the
interested director transaction was valid under the California conflict of
interest statute in light of the statute's disjunctive format. The California
Supreme Court, however, disagreed and voided the contract. The court
concluded that even where the requirements of an alternative in the statute are technically met,3 8 a transaction that is unfair and unreasonable
39
to the corporation may be voided.
Thus, despite the statute's disjunctive wording, the court, in effect,
construed it conjunctively. The court reasoned that the safeguards in the
statute's shareholder approval alternative were not sufficient to prevent
directors from dealing unfairly with their corporations.40 Although the
statute prohibited interested directors from voting in their capacity as
directors, it did not prohibit them from voting in their capacity as shareholders. 4 1 Consequently, a disjunctive approach would have allowed interested directors who owned shares in their corporation to approve their
transactions under the shareholder alternative as Stanley and Sturgis
did. Under the California statute's shareholder alternative, directors like
Stanley and Sturgis were permitted to serve two masters. The directors
simultaneously represented themselves as interested directors and the
corporation as voting shareholders. By allowing interested directors to
represent their corporation, the California statute created the possibility
that the interested directors would favor their interest at the expense of
the corporation's interest. The Minnesota statute precludes this conflict
of interest by prohibiting interested directors from voting as shareholders
to ratify transactions in which they are interested.42
B.

A Proposed Construction of Minnesota's Statute

The court's conjunctive approach in Remillard reflects the opinion of
the majority of courts and commentators. 43 Only a small minority of
38. Remitlard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 241 P.2d at 74. In light of the good faith
requirement contained in the shareholder alternative, it is questionable whether there was
even "technical compliance" on the part of Stanley and Sturgis. See Comment, Corporations- Ojiters and Directors-TheEfect of Statutes on Contracts Between Corporations With Common Directors, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 705, 712 (1953).
39. Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 241 P.2d at 74. Contra Note, The Fairness Test of
Corporate Contracts With InterestedDirectors, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335, 339 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Fairness Test].

40. Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 241 P.2d at 74.
41. See supra note 36 (text of CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1955)).
42. See supra note 11 (text of MINN. STAT. § 302A.255, subd. 1 (1982)).
43. Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 207. For courts using the conjunctive approach, see

Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1974); Tevis v. Beigel, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 90, 99, 344 P.2d 360, 365 (1959); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal.
App. 2d 141, 157, 260 P.2d 823, 831 (1953) (citing Remillard, 109 Cal. App. 2d at 418, 241
P.2d at 74); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v.
Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 111.App. 3d 542, 368 N.E.2d 629 (1977).
For commentators espousing the conjunctive approach, see
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courts and commentators have supported a disjunctive approach for statutes similar to Minnesota's.44 Despite the strong following that Remilard
enjoys, courts which construe Minnesota's conflict of interest statute
should use the disjunctive approach in light of the statute's plain language, safeguards, and legislative history.
1.

Plain Language

Minnesota courts are required by statute to follow the plain meaning
of a statute if its language is clear and unambiguous. 4

5

Section 645.16 of

the Minnesota Statutes states that "when the words of a law in their
application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit."46 This principle of statutory construction reflects the ap47
proach of Minnesota courts.
In construing a statute, courts have looked first to its language, and
have foregone further statutory construction if the language was unambiguous. 48 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "the meaning
of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in
which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the
49
courts is to enforce it according to its terms."
The plain language of the Minnesota statute strongly suggests that a
§ 913; Bulbulia, supra note 4; Cocanower & Hay, The New Arizona Business CorporationAct,
17 ARIz. L. REV. 559, 589 (1975); 43 TENN. L. REV. 155, 159 (1975); cf. Note, The Status of
the Fairness Test Under Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1156, 1158 (1976) (after disinterested director approval of an interested director
transaction, the burden of proof shifts to the opponents of the transaction should the opponents challenge the directors' ratification).
44. For courts using the disjunctive approach, see Cohen v. Ayers, 449 F. Supp. 298
(N.D. I11. 1978), aftd, 596 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211
(Del. 1979) (holding that if a majority of fully informed shareholders ratify an interested
director transaction, an attack on the ratified transaction must normally fail). But cf.
Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512 (Del. Ch. 1978) (stating that a waste of corporate assets
is incapable of ratification without unanimous shareholder consent).
For commentators espousing the disjunctive approach, see E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 144, at 75 (1972); Fairness Test, supra note 39, at 339;
Comment, supra note 38; Note, TransactionsBetween a Corporationand Its Directors.: Where Does
Mississi'ppiStand?, 52 Miss. L.J. 877, 899 (1982).
45. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1982).
46. Id
47. See, e.g., McCaleb v. Johnson, 307 Minn. 15, 17 n.2, 239 N.W.2d 187, 188 n.2
(1976); Graber v. Peter Lametti Const. Co., 293 Minn. 24, 29, 197 N.W.2d 443, 447
(1972); Knopp v. Gutterman, 258 Minn. 33, 40, 102 N.W.2d 689, 695 (1960); Welscher v.
Myhre, 231 Minn. 33, 36, 42 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1950) (stating that if a statute's language is
plain and free from doubt, the legislature's intent must be ascertained from the language
and not from prior statutes on the subject).
48. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); Graber,293 Minn. at 29,
197 N.W.2d at 447 (1972).
49.

See STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 37, at 48.
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court must apply it disjunctively. The operative word in the statute is
the disjunctive conjunction "or" which initially connected the statute's
three original alternatives5O and which was retained as the conjunction
when a fourth alternative was added. 5 1 A Minnesota statute requires
that courts construe the words of a statute, such as the word "or," according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 52 Dictionaries, which are common sources for determining
a word's common and approved usage, 53 clearly indicate that the word
"or" means disjunctive.54
Both courts and commentators construe the word "or" disjunctively.
One commentator has concluded that "[w]hen the term 'or' is used it is
presumed to be used in the disjunctive sense, unless the legislative intent
is clearly contrary."55 Courts have also concluded that "or" calls for a
disjunctive approach or signifies the availability of alternatives.56 Al50. § 302A.255, subd. 1. In the context of other conflict of interest statutes, the use of
the word "or" is not as persuasive as it may seem at first glance. Even though most other
conflict of interest statutes also use "or," some courts apply the statutes conjunctively. See
supra note 43. But see We/scher, 231 Minn. at 36, 42 N.W.2d at 313 (if a statute's language
is plain and free from doubt, the legislature's intent must be ascertained from the language and not from prior statutes on the subject).
51. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
52. MINN. STAT. § 645.08, subd. 1 (1982).
53. See td.,, see also Standafer v. First Nat'l Bank, 236 Minn. 123, 127, 52 N.W.2d 718,
721 (1952); Wescher, 231 Minn. at 38, 42 N.W.2d at 314; Op. Minn. Att'y Gen., 144b-18,
May 17, 1977. But cf Maytag Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 218 Minn. 460, 463, 17
N.W.2d 37, 39 (1944) (construing the conjunctive "and" disjunctively because the tax
statute plainly required it).
Technical words and words with special meaning, however, should be construed according to such special meaning. MINN. STAT. § 645.08(1) (1982). Furthermore, when a
court of last resort has construed the language of a law, a later court can presume that the
Minnesota Legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same
construction to be placed upon such language. Id § 645.17(4). In light of section 645.17,
subdivision 4 and the latter part of Minnesota Statutes section 645.08, subdivision 1, proponents of a conjunctive approach could argue that courts should consider the disjunctive
word "or" to be a technical term and should construe it conjunctively since the Remillard
court did so when it construed the California conflict of interest statute. See supra notes 3641 and accompanying text. The strength of this argument, however, is severely weakened
by the fact that the Minnesota Legislature permitted comments espousing a disjunctive
approach to accompany the conflict of interest statute.
54. See OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 468 (1980); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 806 (1974) ("or" used as a function word to indicate an alternative); FUNK
AND WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1733 (1949)

("or" used as disjunctive).
55.

IA SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14 n.l (C. Sands 4th ed.

1972).
56. See, e.g., George Hyman Const. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 582 F.2d 834, 840 (4th Cir. 1978) (normally, use of the disjunctive indicates
alternatives and requires they be treated separately unless such a construction renders the
provisions repugnant to the act); Azure v. Morton, 514 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1975);
International Union of Elec. & Mach. Workers of Am., Local No. 1140 v. Portec, Inc., 303
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though some courts have suggested that "or" may be construed to mean
"and," these courts have been careful to point out that such a construction is permissible only if it is consistent with legislative intent or necessary to avoid confusion. 57 In enacting its conflict of interest statute, the
Minnesota Legislature permitted statutory commentary which advocates
a disjunctive approach.5 8 Since "or" is commonly used in a disjunctive
sense and since there is no legislative intent suggesting that "or" was used
in another sense, the rules of statutory construction provide a persuasive
argument that the disjunctive approach should prevail.
In addition to the statutory language, the conspicuous absence of certain language in the statute provides a further argument favoring the
disjunctive approach. Had the Minnesota Legislature wanted a conjunctive approach, it could have used the word "and" in place of the word
"or" between alternatives two and three. Or the legislature could have
replaced the word "or" with the word "and" when it added a fourth
alternative to the conflict of interest statute in 1982.59 It is not unreason-

able to assume that the legislature would change a conjunction in a statute from "or" to "and" if it preferred a conjunctive approach,
particularly since it has shown a willingness to do so in the past with a
statute involving arbitration.60
The most plausible way in which the Minnesota Legislature could
have evinced a desire for the conjunctive approach would have been to
insert language requiring fairness in the shareholder and/or director approval alternatives, thus explicitly requiring both fairness and approval
to validate a transaction. Three state statutes have language requiring
fairness in either one or both approval alternatives.61 For example,
Minn. 341, 344, 228 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1975); Boyce v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 121
N.H. 774, 435 A.2d 510 (1981) (where the legislature defined a motor vehicle liability
policy as one which provides "indemnity for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle,
trailer, or semi-trailer," the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's contention
that the statute required coverage for both trucks and trailers, determining that the legislature's use of disjunctive "or" evinced an intent to require coverage for only one vehicle);
Nixon v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 P.2d 24 (Utah 1981).
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet

1985).
59. See id
60. In 1957, the Minnesota Legislature re-enacted section 572.06(2) of the Minnesota
Statutes as part of the Uniform Arbitration Act. Act of Apr. 24, 1957, ch. 633, § 13, 1957
Minn. Laws 853 (currently codified at MINN. STAT. § 572.20 (1982)). In so doing, the
legislature changed the conjunction in subdivision 2 of the statute from "or" to "and." Id
In International Union of Elec. & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Portec, Inc., 303 Minn. 341,
228 N.W.2d 239 (1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court properly noted that this change
evinced the legislative intent for a conjunctive approach instead of a disjunctive one. 303
Minn. at 344, 228 N.W.2d at 242.
61. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977) (requiring under the director approval
alternative that the transaction be just and reasonable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33323(b) (West 1958) (requiring under the director approval alternative that the transaction
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under its director-approval alternative, section 310 of the California Corporation Code requires not only that the directors approve the transaction, but also that the transaction be just and reasonable to the
corporation at the time of approval.62 All three of these statutes, with
language requiring fairness, existed at the time the Minnesota Legislature enacted its conflict of interest statute. 63 Since statutes are presumed
to have been passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all
existing statutes on the same subject, 64 and since the above three statutes
existed at the time of the enactment of Minnesota's conflict of interest
statute, it is reasonable to presume that the Minnesota Legislature was
aware of, but rejected, the format of these three statutes. This presumption is particularly appropriate in the context of the California statute
65
since it was the source of the Minnesota statute.
2. Safeguards
a.

The DirectorAlternative

In addition to the plain meaning of the statute's language, a disjunctive approach for the shareholder and director approval alternatives adequately protects all parties affected by an interested director transaction.
Of the thirty-seven state conflict of interest statutes which contain shareholder and director approval alternatives, 66 Minnesota's statute has the
most safeguards in its approval alternatives.67 Most conflict of interest
statutes require, under the director approval alternative, that the director's interest be disclosed or known to the board which approves the
transaction by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the
not be manifestly unfair); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271A.205 (1981) (requiring under both the
director and shareholder approval alternatives that the transaction not be manifestly
unfair).
62. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977).
63. While the Minnesota statute was enacted in 1981, the California, Connecticut,
and Kentucky statutes were enacted in 1975, 1959, and 1972 respectively. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 310 (West 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-322 (West 1958); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 271A.205 (1981).
64. See, e.g., County of Hennepin v. County of Houston, 229 Minn. 418, 421-22, 39
N.W.2d 858, 860 (1949) (discussing prior and current Minnesota statutes regarding
tuberculosis).
65. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet
1985).
66. In addition to the 37 states cited in the table, rfra note 67, Mississippi and
Vermont also have conflict of interest statutes. These two states, however, are excluded
from the table since their statutes do not have shareholder or director approval alternatives. See Miss. CODE ANN. ch. 79 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, § 2367 (1973).
67. In comparing these 37 statutes, this author reviewed the safeguards in the approval alternatives of each statute. The safeguards in the director approval alternative of
each statute are reflected in the following table:
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votes of the interested directors. 68 In addition to these safeguards, Minnesota's director approval alternative requires that the material facts of
the transaction be fully 69 disclosed or known to the board. 70 Only twelve
of the thirty-six other statutes have a similar requirement. 71 By requiring full disclosure or knowledge of material facts, the Minnesota statute
increases the likelihood that courts will require the interested director to
disclose not only his interest in the transaction, but also his expected
DIRECTOR APPROVAL
Interested
Director

State Statute

Disclure
of Material
FactsRequired

ALA. CODE§ 10-2A-63 (1975)
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 10.041 (1977)
CAL CORP. CODE§ 310 (Wt 1977)
CAL.CORP. CODE§ 820 (West 1955)
COLO.REV. STAT.ANN. § 7-5-114.5(Supp. 1983)
CONN.GEN. STAT.ANN. § 33-323 (West Supp. 1984)
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983)
FLA.STAT.ANN. § 607. 124(West 1977)
GA. CODEANN. § 22-716 (Supp. 1984)
IDAHOCODE§ 30-141 (1980)
ILL. REV. STAr, ch. 32, 157.40a(Supp. 1984)
IND. CODE§ 23-1-10-b(1979)
IOWACODE ANN. § 496A.34 (Supp. 1984)
KAN.STAT. ANN.§ 17-6304(1981)
Ky. REV. STAT.§ 271A.205 (Supp. 1984)
LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 12-84 (1969)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 717 (1964)
MD. CORPS.& ASS'NSCODEANN. § 2419 (Supp. 1983)
MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.1545 (1973)
MINN.STAT.§ 302A.255 (1982)
MONT.CODE ANN. § 35-1413 (1983)
NEB. REV. STAT, § 21-2040.01(1983)
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 78.140(1979)
N.H, REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (1977 & Supp. 1983)
NJ. REV. STAT. § 14A:6-8(Wot 1969)
N.Y.Bus. CORP.LAw § 713 (Corsol 1963)
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-30 (1982)
OHIo REV. CODEANN. § 1701.60(Page 1978)
7
OKLA.STAT.tit. 18, § 1.1 5a (1953 & Supp. 1983)
ORE. REV. STAT.§ 57.265 (1983)
PA. CONS.STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Pardon 1984-1985)
R.I. GEN.LAws§ 7-1.1-37.1(1970)
S.C. CODEANN. § 33-13.160 (La. Co-op. 1977)
TENN.CODEANN. § 48-816 (1979)
VA. CODE§ 13.1-39.1(1978)
W. VA. CODE§ 31-1-25 (1982)
Wis. STAT.ANN. § 180.355(Wart Supp. 1983-1984)
Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1(Supp. 1984)
MODELBus. CORP.ACT § 41

X.

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Discloure
of
Director's GoodFaith
Interest Re- Approval
quired
Required
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Approval
by Majority
of Director,
Required

Ioterted
Director's
Vote Does
Not Count

Prohibited
FromEstablishing
Quorum
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

*Under § 310, disclosure of material facts is not required when the transaction only involves common directors.
[hereinafter cited as Director Approval Table]. For further comparison of state conflict of
interest statutes, see comments to MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 41 (West 1971 & Supp.
1979).
68. See Director Approval Table, supra note 67. Statutes mandating these requirements are patterned after section 41 of the Model Business Corporation Act. Compare
Director Approval Table, supra note 67 with MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT § 41 (Supp. 1979).
69. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255, subd. l(c) (West Special Pamphlet 1985) requires
the person to fully disclose, while the vast majority of conflict of interest statutes omit the
adverb "fully." Compare id with Director Approval Table, supra note 67.
70. § 302A.255, subd. 1(c).
71. See Director Approval Table, supra note 67.
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profit from it,72 if the profit can be estimated at the time of approval.
These additional disclosures would serve to better inform the disinterested directors. A better informed board of directors would, in turn, increase the likelihood that the board would approve only transactions
73
which are fair to the corporation.
In contrast to the majority of conflict of interest statutes, the Minnesota statute also requires the disinterested directors to act in good faith
when approving an interested director transaction.74 As one commentator indicated, this additional requirement of good faith provides opponents of an interested director transaction with a means of arguing
75
fairness under the director approval alternative.
Another difference between the director approval alternative of the
Minnesota statute and the director approval alternative of the other statutes is the voting requirements. The Minnesota statute's voting requirements are stricter both in terms of who can vote 76 and in terms of the
7
number of votes necessary for approval.7
While the Minnesota statute requires that a majority of the board approve interested director transactions,78 most other statutes merely require a majority of the quorum, which in most states is a majority of the
board. 79 Under some conflict of interest statutes, it is conceivable that a
72. Conceivably, courts could construe the majority of statutes, which only require
disclosure of the director's interest, as merely requiring that the director disclose that the
corporation is dealing with him or with an entity in which he has an interest. But see
Flynn v. Zimmerman, 23 11. App. 2d 467, 473, 163 N.E.2d 568, 573 (1960) (a director has
a common law duty to disclose that he is making a personal gain by selling property to his
corporation and the disclosure should include the exact net cost to the director and the
amount of commission paid to him, or the amount of his profit).
73. A statutory provision requiring disclosure of material facts, coupled with a good
faith requirement, significantly increases the likelihood, and perhaps assures, that the
transaction will be fair to the corporation. Where, for example, a board informed of a
better alternative approved the interested director's transaction, a shareholder might succeed in attacking the approval on the grounds of bad faith. See Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc.,
629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980) (when a shareholder attacks the merits of a transaction in
which the directors have an interest other than as directors of the corporation, the directors cannot escape review of the merits of the transaction).
74. § 302A.255, subd. 1(c). Most conflict of interest statutes do not explicitly require
good faith on the part of the directors. This requirement may nevertheless exist under
other corporate statutes or common law. See Director Approval Table, supra note 67.
75. Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 216.
76. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255, subd. l(b), (c) (West Special Pamphlet 1985);
Director Approval Table, supra note 67.
77. See Id.
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255, subd. 1(b), (c) (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
79. See Director Approval Table, supra note 67. The Model Business Corporation Act
requires "a vote . . . sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes" of the interested director. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 41(a) (West 1971). Since a quorum in most
states is a majority of directors and since a vote is sufficient under most statutes if it constitutes a majority of the quorum, the number of disinterested director votes necessary for
approval under most state statutes is surprisingly low. Sete id. § 40. For example, a board
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vote of only one disinterested director would be sufficient to approve an
interested director's transaction.8 0 Thus, the Minnesota statute requires
significantly more votes under its director approval alternative than the
other statutes. Consequently, the Minnesota statute increases the likelihood that before a vote there will be sufficient dialogue and more disinterested directors serving as watchdogs for unfair transactions.
A final distinction between the director alternatives of the Minnesota
statute and other conflict of interest statutes is the standard of conduct
which the approving directors must meet. Pursuant to section 302A.251
of the Minnesota Statutes, a director must discharge his duties in a manner which he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation.8i He must also act with the care of an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position.82 Thus, even if directors approved an "unfair transaction" after compliance with all of the safeguards in Minnesota's director
alternative, an opponent of the transaction could attack it on the
grounds that the approving directors failed to meet the reasonable, prudent person standard. Less than one-third of the states with conflict of
interest statutes have corporate statutes requiring directors to meet a rea83
sonable, prudent person standard.
b.

The Shareholder Alternative

For the most part, the safeguards in the Minnesota statute's shareconsisting of nine directors would require the presence of five directors to establish a quorum. Three of these five directors would be a majority capable of passing a resolution.
Thus, it would be possible for only one-third of this nine-member board to pass a
resolution.
80. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (a)(1) (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-716
(a)(1) (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (a)(1) (1981); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS
CODE ANN. § 2-419 (b)(1)(i) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (1)(b) (West Supp.
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (A)(1)(a) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.175a (1) (West Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-37.1(a)(1) (Supp. 1983). These
conflict of interest statutes permit approval under the director alternative by a vote of a
majority of disinterested directors. Thus, if only one member of a board is disinterested,
that member's vote would be sufficient to approve an interested directors' transaction
since it would be a majority of disinterested directors.
81. Although this safeguard provides additional protection to the shareholders, its
inclusion, along with the inclusion of the good faith requirement in the director alternative, may cause more problems than it solves. An interested director who uses the director
alternative in hopes of avoiding the ambiguous fairness test may find that it is as difficult
to prove that the approving directors acted in a reasonable manner and in good faith as it
is to prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable.
82. § 302A.251, subd. 1.
83. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 comment (West Supp. 1977). In states which do
not have a corporate statute requiring directors to meet a reasonable, prudent person
standard, the common law may place a similar standard upon directors. Se, e.g., Lynch v.
Sapiro, 117 N.J. 485, 488, 176 A. 327, 329 (1935). Segenera4' 1 PRENTICE-HALL, CORPORATIONS
1510 at 1516 (1980).
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holder alternative mirror those in the director alternative.84 Similarly,
the Minnesota shareholder alternative contains more safeguards than
85
shareholder alternatives in other conflict of interest statutes. The approving shareholders must be apprised not only of the director's interest
86
By requiring full disbut also of the material facts of the transaction.
closure of material facts, the shareholder alternative increases the likelihood that the approving shareholders will be fully informed, and
consequently increases the likelihood that the shareholders will approve
84. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.255, subd. 1(b) (1982) (shareholder alternative) with
id § 302A.255, subd. 1(c). Like the director alternative, the shareholder alternative in the
Minnesota statute explicitly requires good faith approval on the part of the shareholders.
However, the reasonable, prudent person standard found in section 302A.251, subdivision 1 applies only to the director alternative. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985).
85. The safeguards contained in the shareholder alternatives of the 37 statutes with
such an alternative are shown in the following table:
SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL

Statute
State
ALA. CODE§ 10-2A-63(1975)
AIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 10.041 (1977)
CAL. CORP.CODE§ 310 (West 1977)
CAL. Cok. CODE§ 820 (Wet 1955)
REV. STAT.ANN.§ 7-5-114.5(Supp. 1983)
Co.
CONN GEN.STAT.ANN. § 33-323 (West. Supp, 1984)
DEL.CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 144 (1983)
FLA.STAT.ANN.§ 607.124 (West 1977)
GA. CODEANN.§ 22-716(Supp. 1984)
IDAHOCODE§ 30-1-41 (1980)
ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 32, 157.40a(Supp. 1984)
IND.CODE ANN.§ 23-1-10(West 1979)
IOWACODE ANN.§ 496A.34 (Supp. 1984)
KAN.STAT. ANN.§ 17-6304(1981)
Ky. REV. STAT.§ 27 IA.205 (Supp. 1984)
LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 12-84 (1969)
ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit. 13-A,§ 717 (1984)
MD. COrPS. & AsS'NsCODE ANN.§ 2-419 (Supp. 1983)
MICH.COMP. LAws§ 450.1545(1973)
MINN. STAT.§ 302A.255 (1982)
MoN. CODEANN.§ 35-1413 (1983)
NEB.REV. STAT.§ 21-2040.01(1983)
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 78.140(1979)
N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. § 293-A:41 (1977 & Supp. 1983)
NJ. REV. STAT.§ 14A:6-8 (West 1969)
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 713 (Coml. 1963)
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-30 (1982)
OHIo REV. CODEANN. § 1701.60 (Page 1978)
OKLA,STAr. tit. 18,§ 1.175a (1953 & Supp. 1983)
OR. REV. STAT.§ 57.265 (1983)
PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. tit. 15,§ 1409.1 (Purdon 1984-1985)
R.I. GEN. LAws§ 7-1.1-37.1(1970)
S.C. CODE ANN.§ 32-13.160(Law. Co-op. 1977)
TENN.CoDE ANN. § 48-816 (1979)
VA. CODE § 13.1-39.1(1978)
W. VA. COD § 31-1-25 (1982)
WIS. STAT.ANN. § 180.355 (West Supp. 1983-1984)
WyO. STAT.ANN. § 17-1-136.1(Supp. 1984)
MODELBus. CoRP. ACT § 41
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x
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X
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*Section 820 requires approval by a "majority of shares entitled to vote." It is unclear if
this means a majority of a quorum or an absolute majority of outstanding shares.
[hereinafter cited as Shareholder Approval Table]
86. § 302A.255, subd. l(b).
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only fair and reasonable transactions. Courts place little significance on
shareholder approval unless all material facts bearing on the fairness or
necessity of an intelligent disposition of a particular transaction are
87
disclosed.
The most important distinction between the shareholder alternatives
in the Minnesota statute88 and the other conflict of interest statutes is the
voting requirement. Only six of the thirty-seven conflict of interest statutes disregard the vote of an interested director-shareholder. 89 The Minnesota statute not only disregards an interested director's vote but
prohibits the interested director from voting. 90 This voting requirement
is probably the Minnesota statute's most significant safeguard. 9 1 The
voting requirement, along with the other safeguards in the shareholder
alternative, virtually assures that a transaction approved under the
shareholder alternative will be fair and reasonable to the corporation,
particularly since it will be in the best interest of the disinterested shareholders, as holders of the corporation's shares, to approve only transactions which are fair to the corporation.92 According to two
commentators, one analyzing the Kansas conflict of interest statute 93 and
the other the Mississippi statute, 94 a provision which prohibits an interested director from voting under the shareholder alternative will protect
96
shareholders as adequately 9 5 as the fairness test.
The number of votes necessary for approval also distinguishes Minne87. See, e.g., United Hotels Co. of Am. v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 816, 819 (2d Cir. 1945);
First Trust & Sav. Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416, 427 (8th Cir. 1938).
See generally H. BALLANTINE, supra note 4, § 71, at 178-79.
88. § 302A.255, subd. 1(b).
89. See Shareholder Approval Table, supra note 85.
90. See § 302A.255, subd. 1(c).
91. An analysis of two of the most prominent cases concerning interested director
transactions illustrates the significance of this voting requirement. In both Remillard Brick
Co. v. Remillard-Dandi" Co., 109 Cal App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952) and Fizegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976), shareholders approved an interested director transaction
but needed the votes of interested director shareholders in order to do so. Since there had
been technical compliance with the shareholder approval alternatives of the applicable
statutes, the Rem slard and Fliegler courts could not apply the fairness test to the transaction
unless they adopted the conjunctive approach, which they did. Had these two courts been
applying the Minnesota statute, which prohibits interested directors and shareholders
from voting, there would have been no technical compliance with the shareholder alternative. This would have allowed the courts to reach the fairness test without adopting the
conjunctive approach.
92. See Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516 (1927); Turner v. American
Metal Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 356, rev'd on other grounds, 268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800,
appeal dismissed, 395 N.Y. 822, 66 N.E.2d 591 (1942).
93. See Comment, The Voidabiliy of InterestedDirector Contracts Under the Kansas Corporation Code, 24 KAN. L. REV. 655, 675 (1976).
94. Note, supra note 44.
95. Id at 899-900.
96. Comment, supra note 93, at 674-75.
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sota's shareholder alternative from other shareholder alternatives. The
Minnesota statute requires the affirmative vote of a majority of outstanding shares. The vast majority of other statutes merely require approval
from the shareholders entitled to vote. 9 7 In their article on conflict of
interest statutes, Professors Bulbulia and Pinto point out the practical
effect of the majority's voting requirement. 98 If one assumes that a majority of shares constitutes a quorum 99 and that a majority of a quorum
constitutes approval, fifty-one shares of a corporation's one hundred outstanding shares would constitute a quorum. A majority of the fifty-one
shares, twenty-six shares or more, would in turn constitute a majority of
the quorum and would therefore be enough to approve an interested director transaction. Thus, whereas the Minnesota statute requires the
vote of an absolute majority of shares, most other statutes require only
the vote of a majority of a majority, which could conceivably be as low as
twenty-six percent of the outstanding shares. too By requiring votes from
a higher percentage of shareholders than other statutes, the Minnesota
statute provides an advocate of an interested director transaction with
greater justification for validating the transaction.
3.

Legislative Hzstory

Comments to the Minnesota conflict of interest statute provide a third
justification for construing the statute disjunctively. According to the
reporter of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, this statute "provides three methods of validati'ng the transactionbecause one of these methods
may be more convenient than either of the other two."1o1 Although the

reporter's comments are "not intended to exhaust the possibilities for
analysis,"102 they are "intended to be a fairly accurate guide to the
97. See Shareholder Approval Table, supra note 85.
98. Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 221-22.
99. Under the first sentence of section 32 of the Model Business Corporation Act, "a
majority of the shares entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy ... constitute[s]
a quorum" unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. § 32 (1982). In no event, however, can less than a third of the shares establish a
quorum. Id A vast majority of states allow corporations to lower the number of shares
necessary for a quorum to one-third. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 32 comments
(1971). At least one state, Louisiana, allows corporations to lower the number to onequarter. Id.
100. If the quorum requirement is lowered to one-third, the percentage of voting

shares necessary to approve an interested director transaction would drop to as low as
17%, thus magnifying the discrepancy between Minnesota's statute and other statutes.
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985)

(emphasis added). The Reporter's Notes to the statute acknowledge that "[i]t may be
necessary to bring [the fairness issue] to court in order to obtain a definitive answer to

questions of fairness and reasonableness." Id
102. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 302A Preface to Reporter's Notes at xxxiii (West Special
Pamphlet 1985).
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meaning, intent, and effect of each section."103 The advisory committee

responsible for drafting and recommending the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, like the reporter, has concluded that the disjunctive approach is the appropriate one for the conflict of interest statute. 104 In its
report to the Minnesota Senate, the Advisory Task Force on Corporation
Law summarized the conflict of interest statute by stating that the statute requires an interested director "to meet certain standards of fairness
or to receive, after full disclosure, the approval of a disinterested majority
of the board of the shareholders."105
To clarify the meaning of its conflict of interest statute, the Minnesota
Legislature could have put an explanation of its legislative intent in the
note following the statute. It could have used language similar to that
found in the comment to Alabama's conflict of interest statute, 106 which
makes clear that in addition to being approved by shareholders or direc10 7
tors, the interested director transaction must be fair and reasonable.
Although the Alabama statute and its comment existed before the enactment of Minnesota's conflict of interest statute, 10 8 the Minnesota Legislature did not request a comment similar to the Alabama one, but instead
permitted a note which advocates a disjunctive approach.109
IV.

WHAT IS "FAIR AND REASONABLE"?

A.

Minnesota

There are enough safeguards in Minnesota's approval alternatives to
adequately protect all parties affected by an interested director transaction as long as the courts require strict compliance with the safeguards.
The practical effect of requiring strict compliance is that the approval
alternatives will be unavailable to those who do not fully comply with
the applicable safeguards, thus forcing them to seek validation by proving that the transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation. Unfor103. Id
104. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 302A Advisory Committee Report at xix (West Special
Pamphlet 1985). According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, courts may use advisory
committee reports, along with other sources, when determining legislative intent. See
State v. Knox, 311 Minn. 314, 318, 250 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1976).
105. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 302A Advisory Committee Report at xix (West Special

Pamphlet 1985) (emphasis added).
106. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-63 comment (1975).
107. Compare id. ("provided the interest or relationship of the director is known or is
disclosed to the board and also that the contract is fair and reasonable, either the board of
directors or the shareholders may approve or ratify a contract with a director") with
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet 1985) ("This
section provides three methods of validating the transaction because one of these methods
may be more convenient than either of the other two.").
108. See supra note 107.
109. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 Reporter's Notes (West Special Pamphlet
1985).
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tunately, neither the language of the new statute nor the reporter's
comments shed much light on the meaning of a "fair and reasonable"
transaction. According to the statute's general comment, the test is
whether reasonable shareholders or directors would have approved the
transaction. The statute's comment concedes that this standard provides
minimal guidance. 110
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the new statute's phrase "fair and reasonable." Prior to the statute's enactment,
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Fountain v. Oreck's, Inc. 111
that a transaction between a director and his corporation must be fair
and reasonable.11 2 Unfortunately, the Fountain court neither defined the
phrase "fair and reasonable" nor suggested factors indicative of a fair
and reasonable transaction. Instead, the court merely concluded that
under the circumstances of the particular case, the transaction was fair
and reasonable.11 3 Minnesota cases involving interested director transactions, decided both before and after Fountath, have similarly declined to
define "fair and reasonable" or to list applicable factors.114
Despite the failure of the Fountain court to define the phrase "fair and
reasonable," a review of the circumstances of Fountain provides insight
into the phrase's meaning. As one commentator stated, "[f]airness in any
one case is purely a function of the facts of that case."' 15 Hence, a fairness test involves a primarily factual and circumstantial inquiry.'1 6 In
Fountain, the plaintiff, an interested director, sought to recover a bonus
granted to him by the defendant corporation's board of directors. At a
board meeting, the directors decided to pay bonuses to the corporation's
officers, including the plaintiff. The amount of the bonuses depended on
the corporation's success and the contributions of each officer.117 During
a subsequent board meeting at which the plaintiff did not vote, the disinterested directors set the plaintiff's bonus at $5000.118 In determining
whether this was a fair and reasonable transaction, the court noted the
110. See id "[I]t may be necessary to bring the matter to court in order to obtain a
definite answer to the questions of fairness and reasonableness." Id
111. 245 Minn. 202, 71 N.W.2d 646 (1955).
112. Id at 207, 71 N.W.2d at 649. The court based its holding, in part, on the conclusion that a director has a fiduciary duty to his corporation. Id at 205-06, 71 N.W.2d at
648-49.
113. See id.at 208, 71 N.W.2d at 650.
114. See Snyder Elec. Co. v. Fleming, 305 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1981); Swenson v. G.O.
Miller Tel. Co., 200 Minn. 354, 274 N.W. 222 (1937); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v.
Peteler Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156 N.W. 255 (1916).
115. Note, Section 21-2040.01: InterestedDirector Transactionsand Considerationsof Fairness,
58 NEB. L. REV. 909, 920 (1979).
116. Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 225.
117. Fountain, 245 Minn. at 208, 71 N.W.2d at 650. The resolution granting the bonuses stated that bonuses would be paid to officers "depending upon the operating results
for the year and the contributions of each officer toward those operating results." Id
118. Id at 204, 71 N.W.2d at 648.
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increased prosperity of the corporation. During the fiscal year which
preceded the granting of the bonus, the corporation realized profits of
only $92,000.119 During the first six months of the fiscal year in which
the bonus was granted, the corporation had shown profits of $60,532.120
The facts indicated that the plaintiffs services were the primary source of
the corporation's increasing prosperity.121 The court also noted that
there was no bad faith or collusion on the part of the approving directors.1 22 Upon these facts the court concluded that the $5000 bonus was
23
fair and reasonable.1
The most significant facts for the Fountain court appear to have been
the value of the services which the interested director rendered to the
corporation and the prosperity of the corporation which resulted from
those services.124 According to the court, the bonus was merely "fitting
compensation for his valuable services rendered during the year."125
B.

OtherJurisdctions

Other jurisdictions have fashioned various standards for analyzing a
transaction's fairness. 126 The United States Supreme Court in Pepper v.
LittonI 27 expressed what is now the most pervasive test of fairness: 128
[T]he burden is on the director. . . not only to prove the good faith of
the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint
of the corporation and those interested therein. .

.

. The essence of

the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction
129
carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain.
Several courts, including the federal district court for Minnesota, have
applied the "arm's length bargain" test.' 30 Other courts have applied
variations of the test by analyzing whether the proposed transaction
would have commended itself to a wholly independent board of direc119. Id at 208, 71 N.W.2d at 650.
120. Id.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id.
124. See id.; see also Ekberg v. Swedish-American Publishing Co., 114 Minn. 196, 130
N.W. 1029 (1911) (sale of corporate assets from corporation to one of its directors must be
for adequate consideration).
125. Fountain, 245 Minn. at 208, 71 N.W.2d at 650.
126. Note, supra note 115, at 921.
127. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
128. Note, supra note 115, at 921.
129. 308 U.S. at 306-07 (citation and footnote omitted).
130. See In re Fergus Falls Woolen Mills Co., 41 F. Supp. 355, 364 (D. Minn. 1941), afd
in part,modifwd and rev'd n part on other groundssub nom. Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491 (8th
Cir. 1942) (both courts employing "arm's length bargain" test); Mueller v. MacBan, 62
Cal. App. 3d 258, 277, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222, 232 (1976); Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich.
111, 120, 108 N.W.2d 907, 911 (1961).
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tors.13 '

In addition to these general tests, courts have applied specific
factors in determining the issue of fairness. Prominent factors include:
the adequacy of the consideration or purchase price;13 2 the extent to
which the interested director discloses all of the relevant facts of the
transaction; 3 3 the influence which the interested director exerts over his
fellow directors;13 4 and the extent to which the interested director represents the corporation in the transaction.135
Despite the popularity of the "arm's length bargain" test and its variants, and the widespread use of such factors as the adequacy of consideration, courts' 3 6 and commentators 3 7 have criticized these tests and
factors as inappropriate in certain situations. According to these critics,
these tests and factors are premised on a court's ability to establish comparative values.' 3 8 They are thus only applicable to contracts involving
easily-priced goods such as stocks which are sold on the open market.13 9
Where the transaction involves something which is not easily priced,
such as a service, these tests and factors are difficult to apply. 14o Critics
.131. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 490, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (1956); Harris Trust
& Sav. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 555, 368 N.E.2d 629, 639
(1977).
132. See George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co. v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 59 N.E.2d 461 (1945);
Alfred J. Brown Seed Co. v. Brown, 240 Mich. 569, 215 N.W. 772 (1927); Ekberg v. Swedish-American Publishing Co., 114 Minn. 196, 130 N.W. 1029 (1911).
133. Tevis v. Beigel, 174 Cal. App. 2d 90, 98, 344 P.2d 360, 365 (1959); Shlensky v.
South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 283, 166 N.E.2d 793, 802 (1960); Voss Oil Co.
v. Voss, 367 P.2d 977, 979 (Wyo. 1962); see also Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222
N.W.2d 71 (1974) (using prior disclosure as a factor in determining the fairness of a director's act of acquiring a corporate opportunity). One court has concluded that the failure
to disclose is in itself unfair. State v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 382, 391 P.2d
979, 984 (1964).
134. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875); Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary,
219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E.2d 524 (1951). Such considerations as the number of interested directors, their presence at the meeting at which the contract was adopted, whether the plan
was initiated by the interested director or by the corporation, and the dominance of the
interested director, determine whether undue influence was exercised. Fairness Test, supra
note 39, at 340.
135. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 71, 91 (1952).
136. Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Heller v.
Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 687 (1941), aj'd,263 App. Div. 814, 32 N.Y.2d 131 (1941).
137. Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 224; Note, Corporate Fiduciay Doctrine in the Context of
Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338, 341 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Fiduciary
Doctrine].
138. See Ewen, 78 F. Supp. at 316-17; Bulbulia, supra note 4, at 224.
139. Bulbulbia, supra note 4, at 224.
140. Id But see Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich. 111, 120, 108 N.W.2d 907, 911
(1961). Thomas involved a lease between two closely held corporations with common directors. Although there were apparently no comparative values which the court could use,
it nevertheless applied the "arm's length" test to determine the fairness of the lease. The
court concluded that the parties did not deal at arm's length because the lease contained
"rather unusual provisions not normally expected to be found in leases negotiated between parties completely independent." Id.
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have also argued that the "arm's length bargain" test is inappropriate to
parent-subsidiary transactions since such transactions rarely involve
bargaining. 141
As an alternative to the "arm's length bargain" test, some courts have
applied tests which rely less on comparative values. 142 To develop these
tests, courts have broken up the interested director's transaction into different categories.143 Essentially, the transactions fall into one of three
45
categories: service contracts, 144 sales of property,1 and loans. 146
In analyzing a service contract, courts in the 1940's used only one objective standard for determining the fairness of the contract: the established rate for the service in the community.i47 In contrast to this onestandard approach, Ruetz v. Toppng148 provides nine standards for measuring the fairness of a service contract. 49 Five of the standards measure
fairness at the time the parties enter into the contract.1 50 These standards are the prevailing economic conditions, the employee's skills and
qualifications, the difficulty of the work to be performed, the business's
compensation policies, and the business's size and complexity. 15, In the
case of small corporations with a limited number of officers, the amount
of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years is also
considered. 152 The remaining standards measure fairness after the services have been performed.1 53 They are the corporation's financial success, the director's dedication to corporate work, and the nature and
1
complexity of work performed. 54
141.

Fduciaty Doctrine, supra note 137, at 340. The "arm's length bargain" test ignores

the economic leverage and decisionmaking powers possessed by the control group in a
parent-subsidiary relationship. Id
Section 302A.255 of the Minnesota Statutes applies to a transaction between a parent
and its subsidiary if they have a common director. See § 302A.255, subd. 1.
142. Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 283, 166 N.E.2d 793, 80102 (1960); Fill Bldgs., Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of Am., 396 Mich. 453,
460, 241 N.W.2d 466, 469 (1976); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624, 628-29 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1970).
143. Fairness Test, supra note 39, at 337.
144. For a discussion of service contracts, see infta notes 147-54 and accompanying text.

145. For a discussion of transactions involving the sale of real property, see bnfia notes
158-73 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of loans, see infa notes 174-80 and accompanying text.

147. See Morris v. North Evanston Manor Bldg. Corp., 319 Ill. App. 298, 49 N.E.2d
646 (1943).
148. 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App. 1970).
149. Id at 628-29.
150. See 37 Mo. L. REV. 531, 536 (1972).
151. See Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r., 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949); Ruetz, 453
S.W.2d at 628-29.
152. Ruetz, 453 S.W.2d at 628-29.
153. See Comment, supra note 150, at 536.
154. See Mayson, 178 F.2d at 119; Ruetz, 453 S.W.2d at 628-29.
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As mentioned earlier in this Note, Minnesota Statutes section
302A.255 requires courts to measure the fairness of a contract either at
the time the transaction was authorized (pre-performance) or at the time
it was ratified (post-performance). 155 The latter three Ruetz factors (postperformance factors) should only be used if the directors ratify the transaction.15 6 Even if the directors ratify a transaction, Minnesota courts
should only use the "corporate profitability" factor as a last resort. This
factor should be de-emphasized because other variables such as government manipulation of the economy may substantially influence the prof7
itability of any company.15
For real property transactions, courts have developed tests which do
not require the establishment of comparative values.158 The court in Fill
Buildings, Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance Co. of America159 used a
two-tiered standard to determine the fairness of a lease between two
companies with a common director.16O The first tier requires a "fair
price" for the property.' 6 ' The second tier requires that the acquisition
further a corporate purpose.' 62 Both tiers must be met.' 63 In F1i Buildings, the plaintiff corporation brought an action for unpaid rent. The
defendant corporation sought to avoid liability for the rent, arguing that
the lease was unfair.64 In determining whether the price was fair, the
court concentrated on the facts that the defendant did not shop
around,165 the cost of remodeling was extremely high,166 and the previous tenant had paid substantially lower rent.' 67 Although the court concluded that the price for the leasehold was fair, the court held that the
plaintiff corporation had failed to establish that the leasehold furthered a
155. See § 302A.255, subd. l(c).
156. Id
157. See Comment, supra note 150, at 537.
158. See Shlensky, 19 Ill. 2d at 283, 166 N.E.2d at 801-02; Fill Bldgs., 396 Mich. at 460,
241 N.W.2d at 469.
159. 396 Mich. 453, 241 N.W.2d 466 (1976).
160. Id at 61, 241 N.W.2d at 469;
161. Id
162. Id
163. Id.
164. Id at 455-56, 241 N.W.2d at 466-67.
165. Id at 459, 241 N.W.2d at 468. The Michigan Supreme Court quoted the trial
court's finding that "there was no testimony of any shopping around for cheaper
quarters." Id
166. Id at 459, 241 N.W.2d at 468-69. In support of his contention that the lease was
fair, the plaintiff offered evidence that he had invested $26,000.00 in remodeling. Id at
459, 241 N.W.2d at 468. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he costs of
extensive renovations and the thrust of expert testimony adduced at trial supported [the]
conclusion [that the price was fair]." Id at 459, 241 N.W.2d at 469.
167. Id at 459, 241 N.W.2d at 468. To make room for the defendant insurance company, the plaintiff had to remove an old tenant who was paying $400.00 per month for the
space. The rent charged to the defendant was $875.00 per month. Id
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corporate purpose for the defendant.' 68 The plaintiff offered no legitimate business reason why the defendant would acquire a long-term lease
while in financial trouble. 169 Thus, although the price was "fair," the
overall transaction was not, due to the fact that the leasehold served no
corporate purpose.
Like the Michigan court in Fill Buildings, the Illinois court in Shlensky v.
South Parkway Building Corp.170 focused on the corporation's need for the
property in question. In Shlensky, the defendant corporation sold fixtures
to the plaintiff corporation. ' 7' The directors of the plaintiff corporation,
who approved the sale, were also directors of the defendant corporation.
Due to this common directorship, there was no approval of the sale by an
independent and disinterested majority of directors. Hence, the court
applied the fairness test. To determine whether the sale of fixtures was
fair to the corporation, the Shlensky court concentrated on the corporation's need for the property.172 After concluding that the plaintiff corporation had no commercial use for the fixtures, the court held the sale
invalid. 173
To determine the fairness of a loan between a director and a corpora74
tion, a court should consider whether the director acted in good faith,'
whether the borrowing or lending of money was to the corporation's benefit,' 75 and whether the transaction was open and otherwise free from
blame.' 76 In concluding that a director's loan was fair, the Connecticut
168. Id at 461, 241 N.W.2d at 469. The court agreed with the defendant's argument
that, even though the price of a product was fair, the sale of that product by a corporate
director would not be "fair" if the purchase furthered no corporate purpose. Id at n.7.
169. Note, supra note 115, at 922.
170. 19 Il1. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960).
171. Id The defendant corporation had also leased space to the plaintiff corporation.
The court analyzed this lease in conjunction with its analysis of the sale of the fixtures. Id
172. Id. at 283, 166 N.E.2d at 801. The court also listed but did not concentrate on the
following factors: the adequacy of the consideration; the corporation's ability to finance
the purchase; whether the corporation could have obtained a better bargain from another
source; whether the corporation was harmed as a result of the transaction; and whether
there was full disclosure. Id at 283, 166 N.E.2d at 801-02.
173. Id at 285, 166 N.E.2d at 802.
174. Wages v. Weiner, 381 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1967); Ebert-Hicken Co. v. ScottBevier Iron Min. Co., 177 Minn. 72, 75, 224 N.W. 454, 455 (1929).
175. In re Madelaine, Inc., 164 F.2d 419, 420-21 (1947); Western Inn Corp. v. Heyl, 452
S.W.2d 752, 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); see also MINN. STAT. § 302A.501, subd. 1(b) (1982)
(corporation may loan money to its director-employee if the loan may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 47 (West 1977).
176. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 952. The fairness of a loan, however, may be
academic in certain situations. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court in Snyder
Elec. Co. v. Fleming, 305 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1981), a director is prohibited from giving a
corporation a secured loan while it is insolvent or verges on insolvency if the effect is to
enable the director to recover a greater percentage of his debt than general creditors of the
corporation with otherwise similarly secured interests. Id at 869. Section 48.75 of the
Minnesota Statutes also prohibits trust companies from lending funds to its directors. A
person who violates this section is guilty of theft. MINN. STAT. § 48.75 (1982).
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court in Ferrisv. Polycast Technology Corp.17 7 emphasized that the loan was
necessary for business reasons. 178 The corporation in Ferri's required
money to meet the demands of its trade creditors. 179 The business necessity, together with the absence of any evidence of harm to the corporation, satisfied the director's burden of proof that his loan was "prima
facie fair" within the requirements of section 33-323(d)(3) of the Connecticut General Statutes. 8 0
As the emergence of various fairness tests might suggest, no one test
stands above the rest. The pervasive "arm's length bargain" test does
little to clarify the meaning of the phrase "fair and reasonable." In reality, this test defines the ambiguous phrase, "fair and reasonable transaction," with another ambiguous phrase, "arm's length bargain," thus
leaving the decision of fairness totally up to the court's discretion and/or
the facts of the case. Where comparative values exist or where the transaction involves goods or services sold on the open market, courts should
consider the factors of adequate consideration, full disclosure, and disinterested representation.
These factors, which arguably are what makes a transaction an arm's
length bargain, are a good starting point for courts. Where comparative
values are not available and the transaction involves a service contract,
property, or loan, the courts should use the particular tests developed for
these transactions. Since fairness is essentially a function of the facts of
the case,' 8 however, the courts should mold the test to fit the facts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although Minnesota's first conflict of interest statute resembles other
state conflict of interest statutes which courts have applied in a conjunctive manner, the intent and wording of Minnesota's statute calls for a
disjunctive application. 8 2 While the statutory language, reporter's
notes, and advisory committee's comments all indicate that the disjunctive approach is the proper one, there is also a complete absence of language in the statute and note suggesting a contrary approach. In
comparison to the other conflict of interest statutes, Minnesota's statute
has more and stronger safeguards in the approval alternatives than the
vast majority of other statutes.18 3 By prohibiting interested directors not
177. 180 Conn. 199, 429 A.2d 850 (1980).
178. Id at 205, 429 A.2d at 854.
179. At trial, the director explained that he was forced to sell some of his stock in the
company to raise the money to meet these creditors' demands. Hence, the issue of fairness
involved not only the loan but also the sale of the stock to raise the money for the loan.

The court concluded that this sale of stock, like the loan, did not harm the company. Id.
180. Id
181. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 43-65, 101-09 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 66-100 and accompanying text.
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only from voting, but also from establishing a quorum under both the
director and shareholder alternatives, the Minnesota statute goes one
step further than the other statutes in protecting the parties involved. By
requiring strict compliance with all of the safeguards in the applicable
approval alternatives, Minnesota courts should be able to protect all the
parties affected by the transaction.
Although one might think the fairness test loses much of its significance under the disjunctive approach, its significance will survive if
courts consistently preclude the approval alternatives where strict compliance with the alternatives' safeguards is lacking. Since neither the
Minnesota statute nor its comment sheds much light on the meaning of a
"fair and reasonable" transaction and since fairness in any one case is
purely a function of the facts of that case, predicting what is necessary to
pass the fairness test is difficult. The most pervasive test of fairness is
whether the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. 8 4 In the same vein, some courts have concentrated on whether an
independent board would have ratified the transaction.185 For unique
transactions, such as those involving a service contract, real property, or
a loan, however, courts will have difficulty applying these tests. For these
transactions, the particular tests developed for these transactions should
be used. 186
184. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 136-81 and accompanying text.
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